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Ad-hoc wireless networks distinguish themselves from their traditional wired
counterparts by three unique characteristics: mobility, lack of infrastructure, and
shared wireless channel. These properties have gained popularity in various military
and civilian applications, but have also introduced challenging problems in terms of
ensuring satisfying network performance and network security. Ad hoc networks are
a fertile ground for new threats and security problems. We start by demonstrating
how new covert attacks can be launched by using the ad hoc network protocols.
In particular, nodes in ad-hoc wireless networks have to cooperate with each other
in order to accomplish many networking functions such as routing and channel ac-
cess. We observe that covert information can be conveyed during the cooperation
procedure. It is very difficult to eliminate or even detect these covert channels.
Simulation results show that performance of these covert channels depends on vari-
ous network characteristics. Anonymous communication has been considered as one
possible way of fighting covert threats. In fact, anonymity and privacy by them-
selves have attracted intensive attention as important societal issues and desirable
security features. One of the key components in most anonymous routing protocols
is anonymous trapdoors, for which we propose a new construction scheme based
on pairing-based cryptographies. More careful analysis has shown that anonymity
could be in conflict with other secure properties and secure mechanisms, such as ac-
countability and intrusion detection. We propose a solution that can flexibly trade
off anonymity against accountability according to the needs of individual applica-
tions. The basic idea is to distribute the real identity of a given user among a set
of pseudonyms in such a way that only a sufficient number of pseudonyms can lead
to the recovery of the identity. Users authenticate each other anonymously under
pseudonyms. When the number of times a user is caught misbehaving exceeds the
threshold, the user’s real identity can be recovered from the pseudonyms that had
been used. Thus, accountability is enforced.
As conclusion, we propose to jointly investigate and incorporate all different
secure properties by using various secure mechanisms across multiple protocol layers
of the network.
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Ad-hoc wireless networks distinguish themselves from their traditional wired
counterparts by three unique characteristics: mobility, lack of infrastructure, and
shared wireless channel. These properties have gained popularity in various military
and civilian applications, but have also introduced challenging problems in terms
of ensuring satisfying network performance and network security. Ad hoc networks
are a fertile ground for new threats and security problems.
In this dissertation, we focus on two security problems: covert channels and
anonymous communication, both related to hiding information in wireless ad hoc
networks.
1.1 Covert Channels in Ad Hoc Networks
Covert channels are concealed communication paths whose usage or even the
very existence is not anticipated in the original design of a communication system[1].
Covert communication happens when one user intentionally manipulates and em-
beds information into some properties of the system in such a way that the extra
information can be detected by specific designated users in the system.
Most of the past studies on covert channels have been concentrated on multi-
level computer systems or wired computer networks. However, wireless commu-
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nication networks involve a fundamentally new and ubiquitous environment with
new and different variables that can be manipulated in order to convey covert in-
formation. The absence of fixed infrastructure and central control puts the burden
of network organization and maintenance on the terminal nodes themselves. The
decentralized style of operations empowers the nodes to manipulate the system indi-
vidually. Since the nodes control their own behavior, they may manipulate the sys-
tem parameters through legitimate operations in such a way that covert information
can be embedded and conveyed. At the same time, the high degree of randomness
in ad-hoc networks, due to factors such as node mobility, provides camouflage for
the covert operations.
Anonymous communication was first suggested in [2] as one possible way of
fighting covert threats. In fact, anonymity and privacy by themselves have attracted
intensive attention as desirable security features.
1.2 Anonymous Communication in Ad Hoc Networks
Privacy has always been an important real world societal issue. User privacy
in the cyberspace is needed for various reasons from enabling the e-commerce appli-
cations to supporting the freedom of speech ([3, 4, 5, 6]). Preserving privacy under
the inherently open wireless communication networks ([7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14])
has demonstrated even more challenging problems. The open wireless medium vul-
nerable to both eavesdropping and jamming has posed great challenges in protecting
the communication between users.
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In Chapter 3, we propose a new construction scheme of anonymous trapdoors.
Anonymous trapdoor is utilized in most of the current wireless anonymous commu-
nication schemes ([11, 7, 13]) to hide the receiver identities. An anonymous trapdoor
is a special token generated by a trapdoor function. The function is difficult to invert
unless you are the designated receiver who has some secret information related to
the trapdoor. In other words, only the designated receiver can open the trapdoor.
Anonymity further requires that the other users not only cannot open the trapdoor,
but neither can they recognize who has the capability.
1.3 Anonymous Authentication with Distributed Anonymity Revo-
cation
Unfortunately, anonymity can be misused. A compromised user can abuse
anonymity and launch malicious attacks without being detected. On the other hand,
accountability ensures that events of interest can be linked to specific users such that
responsibility can be assigned if something goes wrong. Without accountability, it
would be impossible to know who caused the observed or suspected malfunction and
what counteractions should be taken against whom in order to contain the damage.
Obviously, anonymity and accountability are two conflicting properties by def-
inition. Existing anonymous communication schemes combat this problem by re-
voking anonymity when misbehavior is detected. Revocation of anonymity depends
on the existence of centralized authority(CA), who maintains the mapping between
user identity and user pseudonyms. However, in ad hoc networks, it cannot always
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be assumed that such a centralized control is constantly available. It is crucial
for the network users to be able to identify the misbehaving nodes by themselves
and take proper counteractions. Current anonymous communication protocols for
ad hoc networks, ANODR [11] and MASK [14] for example, either do not support
anonymity revocation at all [11] or rely on some centralized control to do so [14].
We propose an anonymous authentication architecture with distributed anonymity
revocation. The anonymity revocation protocol does not depend on the existence of
any on-line trusted third parties. Instead, given enough information about a user’s
pseudonyms, anybody can revoke the anonymity of that user.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
This dissertation is structured as follows. It starts with Chapter 2 by demon-
strating how new covert attacks can be launched through manipulating the ad hoc
network protocols. We investigate the ad-hoc wireless networks’ susceptibility to
covert channels through the use of standard routing and MAC protocols. To support
anonymous communication, a new construction scheme of anonymous trapdoors is
introduced in Chapter 3 with detailed analysis of its properties. Based on the same
cryptographic primitives used for the trapdoor, an anonymous authentication ar-
chitecture with distributed anonymity revocation is introduced in Chapter 4. We
discuss future work and conclude in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Covert Channels in Ad Hoc Networks
This chapter investigates ad-hoc wireless networks’ susceptibility to covert
channels that can be formed through manipulating the network protocols. It is very
difficult to eliminate or even detect these covert channels. Simulation results show
that performance of these covert channels depends on various network character-
istics. Countermeasures against these covert channels are needed and also should
adapt to the network changes to take full effect.
2.1 Motivation
Covert channels are concealed communication paths whose usage or even the
very existence is not anticipated in the original design of a communication system[1].
Covert communication happens when one user intentionally manipulates and em-
beds information into some properties of the system in such a way that the extra
information can be detected by specific designated users in the system. A covert
channel, to be useful, does not need high bit rate or high capacity or even low loss
rate. It is generally satisfactory if it can transmit a few bits per second with some
positive probability. For example, only a few bits are needed to disclose the time of
an attack or the PIN number of a personal bank account. However, a covert channel,
to be effective, must be difficult to detect. This is a paramount requirement.
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Existence of the covert channels violates both secrecy and integrity properties
of trusted systems [15]. For example, in a multilevel trusted system, users with
higher secret clearance are not allowed to send data to users with lower clearance.
But a covert channel existing between the two different clearance levels can be
used to communicate sensitive information. Under the “Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)” of US Department of Defense [16], rigorous covert
analysis is required for high assurance security systems.
Most of the past studies on covert channels have been concentrated on multi-
level computer systems or wired computer networks. However, wireless commu-
nication networks involve a fundamentally new and ubiquitous environment with
new and different variables that can be manipulated in order to convey covert in-
formation. The absence of fixed infrastructure and central control puts the burden
of network organization and maintenance on the terminal nodes themselves. The
decentralized style of operations empowers the nodes to manipulate the system in-
dividually. Since the nodes control their own behavior, they may manipulate the
system parameters through legitimate operations in such a way that covert infor-
mation can be embedded and conveyed. At the same time, the high degree of
randomness in ad-hoc networks, due to factors such as node mobility, provides cam-
ouflage for the covert operations. It is hard to tell whether the nodes’ activities are
legitimate responses to the network changes or unexpected covert operations. The
shared wireless medium facilitates the covert reception procedure further. For most
cases, a covert receiver only needs to passively monitor the channel to obtain the
covert information and hence is fully protected from detection.
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This chapter demonstrates the ad-hoc wireless networks’ susceptibility to covert
channels through the use of standard routing and MAC protocols [17].
2.2 Covert Operations through the Use of Reactive Routing Proto-
cols
One of the most basic problems in the operation of ad-hoc networks that has
attracted a great deal of attention is to design route algorithms that can dynamically
adapt to network topology changes and provide correct routes between communicat-
ing users in a timely and efficient manner. There have been many such algorithms
developed over the past 10 to 15 years (e.g. see [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]). A
class of routing protocols well-suited to ad-hoc networks is the so-called reactive
protocols, like AODV [21] and DSR [22]. Both of these are rooted in the logic of
the algorithm developed in [19, 20]. With that logic, in lieu of periodic flooding of
routing information, reactive initiation of routes occurs according to need. A source
sends route request messages only when the source needs to communicate with a
destination provided that a valid route to the destination is not already available.
The route request is broadcast in the network until it reaches the destination or
some intermediate users who possess a route to the desired destination.
Covert channels can be built by taking advantage of the on-demand mechanism
which allows the nodes to manipulate their own routing packets. In this section, I
use the AODV protocol as an example. Four covert transmission mechanisms are
presented that make use of different entries and properties of the routing packets.
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Three of them have some limitations for their implementation. The fourth, however,
seems to be perfectly implementable and is further evaluated through simulation.
The first three will be briefly discussed to illustrate how covertness can be achieved,
but will focus mostly on the fourth one. Performance of such covert channels depends
on multiple factors, such as network size, user mobility, traffic rate, and transmission
range. Simulation results show that the mobility of users, usually harmful to data
network performance, turns out to be beneficial to the covert communication. Other
on-demand routing protocols, including most of the secure routing protocols, share
similar susceptibility properties to covert channel attacks. I focus on the AODV
protocol since it is one of the most prominent protocols under consideration today,
and not because I want to single it out in terms of vulnerability.
2.2.1 Overview of AODV
This section reviews those characterizations of AODV that are needed for the
description of the covert attacks. For full details of the protocol, please refer to [21].
2.2.1.1 The On-demand Mechanism
The main idea of AODV is to avoid the large amount of periodic route control
traffic by issuing route queries based on nodes’ actual demands. In fact the root of
this idea can be found in [19, 20]. When a source needs to communicate with some
destination, for which a valid route is not already available, the source initiates a
route discovery procedure by broadcasting a route request for the destination. The
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route request propagates through the network until it reaches the destination node
or some intermediate nodes that can provide the reply, provided the network is
connected.
2.2.1.2 Sequence Number
The AODV protocol inherits the concept of destination sequence number from
the destination sequenced distance vector (DSDV) routing algorithm [18] to ensure
that the discovered routes are free from loops. Each node i in the network maintains
a nondecreasing sequence number Seqi. Node i may increment its sequence number
under only two circumstances:
• Immediately before it initiates a route discovery;
• Immediately before it originates a route reply as a destination node in response
to a route request by another node.
In the routing table, each route entry is associated with the last known des-
tination’s sequence number. When a route request is constructed, this last known
destination sequence number is attached to the route request (an unknown sequence
number flag is set if no sequence number is known). The sequence number of the
source is also enclosed in the route request to facilitate establishing the reverse route.
Let “Src” and “Dest” stand for source and destination. The route request (RREQ)
and route reply (RREP) messages contain the following information respectively:
< IDDest, SeqDest, IDSrc, SeqSrc, Hop Count, . . .> and
< IDDest, SeqDest, IDSrc, Hop Count, lifetime, . . .>.
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The dots indicate additional fields that are not of interest here. When a node
is presented with two valid routes to the same destination, it always chooses the
fresher route, i.e. the one associated with larger destination sequence number. If
the two routes are of the same freshness, the one with smaller hop count is chosen.
The Lifetime value specifies the time after which the routing information is invalid.
It is further explained next.
2.2.1.3 Route Table Management
In order to control the dissemination of stale route information, each valid
route is also associated with a Lifetime value, which is the time after which the
route is invalidated. The lifetime of a valid route is initially determined from the
route control packets and later updated whenever the route is used to transmit data.
An invalidated route is removed from the route table after a fixed period of time.
2.2.1.4 Route Maintenance
Movement of nodes causes link breaks and new node encounters. Once a
neighbor is found to be unreachable, the node first invalidates all the routes that have
that neighbor as their next hop. Then it forwards to all the affected upstream active
neighbors a route error message, which contains those disconnected destination
identities along with their last known sequence numbers. Receivers of the error
message subsequently follow the same procedure and relay the error message to
their upstream active neighbors. When the error message arrives at the source, the
10
source re-initiates the route discovery process if the route is still needed.
2.2.1.5 Expanding Ring Search Technique
The AODV protocol uses an additional feature, called expanding ring search,
to control the broadcast of the route requests. The source node initially puts a time
to live (TTL) value in the IP header of the route request and sets a timeout for
receiving the route reply. The TTL value specifies how many hops the route request
can travel away from the source. When the route request times out without receiving
a reply, the route request is broadcast again with an incremented TTL value. This
continues until the TTL value reaches a threshold. Later attempts eventually set
their TTL values to be the network diameter so that they can traverse the entire
network, if necessary.
2.2.2 Covert Channels in AODV
The AODV protocol provides routes between mobile nodes reactively by exe-
cuting the route discovery process as outlined above. However, the route information
carried in the route control packets can be used to convey additional information,
which is independent of the original intention of the protocol design.
There are four covert channels immediately obvious in the use of AODV. Three
of them have some limitations for their implementation. The fourth, however, seems
to be perfectly implementable. The reason the first three are discussed is to show the
rich variety of possibilities for covert transmission and to demonstrate the limitations
11
of some obvious covertness possibility in ad hoc networks.
2.2.2.1 Timing the Route Request
If a node can distinguish delays between successive route requests originated
by a source, extra information can be deduced from the timing chosen by the source.
It is quite common for covert channels to rely on timing information.
Implementing this channel requires synchronization between the source and
the covert information receiver, which is not easily achieved in an ad-hoc wireless
network. Plus, such a channel is seriously noisy since the source can never guarantee
an exact time when its route request arrives at a particular node. In a multi-hop
ad-hoc wireless network, the route requests can even arrive out of their transmis-
sion order. So, relying on the timing of route requests for covert transmission is
problematic.
2.2.2.2 The Source Sequence Number in the Route Request
There are two different ways to convey covert information through manipulat-
ing the source sequence number field in the route requests.
The first one is to embed the covert information into the increments of the
source sequence number between successive route requests. Before constructing a
route request, the node increases its sequence number to a specific value such that
the increment represents the covert symbol to be transmitted. However, this covert
operation is easily detectable by the arbitrary size of increase in the node’s sequence
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number. Also, use of this covert mechanism may lead to the rapid exhaustion of the
size of the sequence number field in the control packets.
The second choice is to embed the covert information into the increments of the
source sequence number within a fixed period of time. A node controls the increment
by constructing a number of route requests within this period. Similar to the timing
channel described in Section 2.2.2.1, this covert channel requires synchronization
between the covert transmitter and receiver, since they have to agree on the time
to start counting. It also suffers from the field size exhaustion deficiency mentioned
above. So, this covert channel choice is problematic as well.
2.2.2.3 The Lifetime Field in the Route Reply
When a node constructs route replies as an intermediate node, the lifetime
entry in the route requests is computed from the corresponding lifetime entry in its
routing table. The lifetime entry in the routing table indicates when is the last time
that the route was used. Receivers of this route reply may derive extra information
through looking into how recently the route was used by its constructor.
Exploiting this channel requires the covert transmitter to construct the route
replies regularly which means the covert transmitter has to receive the correspond-
ing route requests regularly. However, other nodes’ demand for routes can not be
directly controlled by the covert transmitter and receiver. Even if the other nodes
do send the request, the reply is unicast back to the corresponding inquirer. So
the probability that the covert receiver misses the reply is high. If the covert re-
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ceiver sends these route requests itself, the frequent sending of the requests may
cause exposure and discovery. Thus, this alternative for covertness has also serious
drawbacks.
2.2.2.4 The Destination ID Field in the Route Request
Covert information also can be embedded in the destination identity of route
request messages. For a network with N nodes, up to log2(N−1) bits of information
can be deduced by noting which destination is requested at any given time.
This covert channel does not require synchronization between the covert trans-
mitter and receiver. Order of reception is enabled through the source sequence
number contained in the route request. Plus, the covert information is carried by
the route requests which are broadcast in the network. So the probability of loss
is expected to be lower than that of the previous methods. For these reasons, this
covert channel is considered a fruitful option for covert communication and hence,
it is examined in detail.
The following assumptions have been made:
1. The covert transmitter and receiver share an alphabet which can be composed
of any node IDs except the covert transmitter’s ID;
2. Covert symbol i is transmitted, if the covert transmitter originates a route
request for destination i;
3. The covert transmitter controls its own demands for routes. Other than that,
it complies with AODV;
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4. Apart from the covert transmitter, all the other nodes issue route discoveries
based on their actual demands.
5. The covert receiver passively monitors the channel and observes route re-
quests issued by the covert transmitter, if these requests reach the covert
receiver.
Assumption (3) allows the covert transmitter to generate route requests for any
destination. However, the covert transmitter has to comply with the AODV protocol
when sending the route requests. For example, a route request can be sent only when
no valid route to the destination is already available, and the covert transmitter can
not exceed the route request transmission rate specified by the AODV protocol.
Otherwise, use of the covert channel is easily detectable by monitoring whether the
AODV protocol is violated by any network users.
Covert transmission depends on the availability of the route to the intended
node. When the route with the desired destination ID (as required by the covert
message) is not already available at the covert transmitter, the covert transmitter
can construct and broadcast a route request for the destination. The covert symbol
is thus broadcast as part of the request. If a valid route to the intended node is
already available, the covert transmission process is stuck. Notice that although
the covert transmitter does not generate any RREQs when it is stuck, it still may
construct RREPs as the destination in response to RREQs by other nodes. The
covert transmitter increases its sequence number by 1 each time it constructs a new
RREQ or a new RREP as the destination.
15
Figure 2.1: the covert transmission procedure through the use of AODV
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Fig. 2.1 shows the covert transmission procedure as consisting of an initial-
ization phase and two operational phases, separated by dash-dotted lines. In the
figure, current S stands for the sequence number of the covert transmitter, last S is
the sequence number of the covert transmitter at the most recent time the covert
transmitter tried to make a covert transmission, and D is the covert symbol to
transmit. The covert transmission procedure can be described as the following:
1. Transmitting: The covert transmitter reads in the next covert symbol to
transmit. Assume it is D. The covert transmitter checks if it already has
a valid route to the desired destination D. If not, the covert transmitter
constructs and sends out a RREQ for destination D, and goes back to the
beginning of this step to read the next covert symbol to transmit. If a valid
route to the desired destination D is already available, the covert transmission
is stuck. The covert transmitter enters the waiting phase.
2. Waiting: the covert transmitter stays in this phase until either the route
to the destination D becomes invalid or it receives a RREQ from another
node for which it is the requested destination. In the first case, the covert
transmitter directly goes back to the beginning of step (1) to resume the
covert transmission. In the second case, the covert transmitter first constructs
and sends back the corresponding RREP, and then goes back to step (1).
Either way, the covert symbol D that the covert transmission was stuck upon
is skipped without ever been transmitted.
As it will be further explained next, in order to enable reordering at the covert
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receiver’s side, the covert transmitter’s sequence number is used as index of the
covert symbols. One sequence number identifies one covert symbol’s position in the
covert stream. In case that the covert transmitter’s sequence number is increased by
more than 1 between two consecutive covert transmissions, for instance by ∆ + 1,
then ∆ covert symbols in the covert stream have to be skipped correspondingly
without being transmitted.
Covert reception is a passive procedure in which the covert receiver monitors
the channel and observes route requests originated by the covert transmitter (as
well as by other nodes). Although this covert channel is noise free, it is subject to
symbol loss. First of all, the route requests are not guaranteed to be captured by
the covert receiver for reasons such as intermediate nodes constructing the reply and
stopping the forwarding of the route requests, or the expanding ring search technique
controlling the dissemination of the route requests, or the covert transmitter and
covert receiver simply not being connected. Additionally, the skipping of covert
symbols during the transmission procedure is another cause of symbol loss.
So, each RREQ from the covert transmitter carries a covert symbol and the
corresponding sequence number of the covert transmitter when the covert symbol
was injected into the network. The covert receiver arranges the received covert
symbols in the increasing order of the covert transmitter’s sequence number. Any
gap between two successive source sequence numbers implies loss of covert symbols.
In the next section, performance of this covert channel is evaluated under
various network conditions through simulation. But before that, I would like to
reemphasize here that it is not only AODV that is vulnerable to covert communi-
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cations. Other on demand routing protocols have similar vulnerabilities, including
most of the secure routing protocols. It is discussed in Section 2.2.5 the vulnerability
of other reactive routing protocols to covert attacks.
2.2.3 Performance Evaluation
Performance of the covert channel is evaluated through simulation. A packet
level discrete event simulator is developed to measure the covert channel performance
under a variety of conditions. Although the simulation results are only isolated
data points which can not describe the covert channel completely, the purpose is to
demonstrate quantitatively some of the covert channel characteristics.
2.2.3.1 Simulation
The network is simulated as a group of nodes moving around in a 500×500m2
square area according to the random way point mobility model [22]. Traffic streams
are generated at each node according to independent Poisson processes with the
same traffic rate in terms of packets per second. The destination is randomly selected
among all the nodes in the network except the source itself. All packets are 64 bytes
long.
Simplified assumption has been made about the MAC protocol that there is
no MAC layer channel contention. Inclusion of a detailed MAC protocol would
have a moderate effect on the performance of the covert channel, but it is not
considered here. All the nodes have a common maximum transmission range. The
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channel capacity is 2Mbits/sec. Transmission is successful if the receiver is within the
maximum transmission range of a transmitter. Otherwise, packets are lost. Since the
purpose is to evaluate the routing protocol’s susceptibility to covert communications,
these are reasonable MAC layer simplifications.
The simulated network contains N nodes. Each node has a unique ID that
takes the values 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. Node 0 is the covert transmitter and node 1 is
the covert receiver. The covert transmitter and covert receiver share an alphabet
composed of IDs of all the nodes except the covert transmitter, i.e. 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
It is assumed that the input symbols are equally probable.
The AODV protocol parameters are chosen according to the default values
given in [21], except that most of the simulation results are obtained without ap-
plying the expanding ring search technique. The purpose here is to study the fun-
damental potential of AODV for hosting covert communication.The expanding ring
search technique is considered as a protocol parameter that may affect this poten-
tial. Its effect is studied by running a separate set of simulations with the expanding
ring search technique applied.
The performance of interest includes transmission rate, channel throughput,
probability of loss, and detectability of the covert communication. Denote SymbolTransmitted
and SymbolReceived to be the average number of covert symbols transmitted and re-
ceived per second, respectively. The transmission rate T is defined as the average
number of covert bits transmitted per second and the covert throughput R as the
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average number of covert bits received per second, which are given by:
T = SymbolTransmittedlog2(N − 1) (2.1)
R = SymbolReceivedlog2(N − 1). (2.2)
The probability of loss P is calculated as
P = (T − R)/T (2.3)
The covert communication is implemented without applying any physical layer
channel coding/decoding algorithms. The throughput may increase if appropriate
coding is applied.
2.2.3.2 Simulation Results
Simulation results are obtained under multiple varying parameters, namely,
the network size, the maximum speed and maximum pause time of the nodes, the
traffic rate, and the transmission range. To study the effect of each of them, the
simulation results are organized in groups. Within each group, there is only one
varying parameter with the others fixed to their default values. The default values
of those varying parameters are given in TABLE 2.1. For different network sizes, the
maximum transmission range is calculated in such a way that there is on average π
neighbors within a node’s transmission range.
Each data point is the average of 10 independent runs. Each was executed for
900 seconds of simulation time, except that for the case of network size of 257, the
simulation time was 125 seconds.
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(a) Varying Network Size



















































(b) Varying Maximum Speed








































































































(d) Varying Transmission Range


















































(e) Varying Traffic Rate






















































(f) Expanding Ring Search
Figure 2.2: Covert Channel Performance in AODV
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Table 2.1: Default Values of the Simulation Parameters
Parameters DefaultV alues
network size 65
pause time 100 sec
max speed 10 m/s
max transmission range 62.5 m
traffic rate per source 5 packets/sec
Fig. 2.2(a) presents the covert channel performance relative to the network
size. Larger network size means larger input alphabet. The covert transmission
rate and throughput increases as the network size grows. However, growth of the
network also means larger distance between the covert transmitter and covert re-
ceiver, in terms of hop count. The route requests are more likely to be answered by
intermediate nodes. The covert transmission gets less chance to be freed from stuck
status. As a result, the probability of loss is greater and the channel throughput
decreases.
Fig. 2.2(b) and 2.2(c) illustrates the effect of nodes mobility on the covert
channel. Higher mobility of the nodes causes more link breakage, thus providing
more excuses for covert transmission while fewer intermediate nodes are able to
generate the route replies. The covert channel performs better as the network mo-
bility increases.
Fig. 2.2(d) presents the covert channel performance in regard to the transmis-
sion range. When the transmission range is small, the network is so poorly connected
that the route requests can not reach every node. The probability of loss is close to
1. Plus, if the covert transmitter can not receive a route request for itself, the covert
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transmitter tends to stay stuck for a longer time. The transmission rate is low and
the covert throughput is even lower. As the transmission range increases, the prob-
ability of loss decreases and transmission rate increases. But, when the transmission
range becomes 800m, the network is fully connected. The covert transmitter has no
excuses for covert transmission and the covert throughput drops back to zero
The presence of network traffic is a prerequisite for covert information trans-
mission since it generates the need for routes, including the route to the covert
transmitter. Note that when covert transmission is stuck, more RREQs for the
covert transmitter means more opportunities to come out of the stuck state. So,
the transmission rate increases as the traffic rate increases. This is reflected in Fig.
2.2(e).
All of the above results are obtained without applying the expanding ring
search technique. In Fig. 2.2(f) these results are compared against the case of using
the technique. The TTL start value, increment step, and threshold are equal to 1, 2,
and 7 respectively, as suggested in [21]. Since the expanding ring search technique
suppresses the distribution of the route requests, it increases the probability of loss.
Also, the transmission rate is lower because the covert transmitter is less likely to
receive route requests for itself. The covert channel throughput is reduced to about
half of its original value.
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2.2.4 Detectability
Consider the detection of covert communications as composed of three com-
ponents: determination of whether there is a covert transmission going on, deter-
mination of the identity of the covert receiver, and determination of the identity
of the covert transmitter. Our covert channel provides absolute protection on the
covert receiver’s identity and it is very difficult to decide whether the covert channel
is actually in use.
As described in the previous parts of this chapter, the reception procedure of
the covert operation is simply to passively monitor the route requests originated by
the covert transmitter. So the covert receiver is fully protected from exposure.
To detect the covert transmissions and the covert transmitter ID, there are
two ways: through observing some abnormality in the network or observing an
abnormality in the behavior of the covert transmitter. Since the covert transmission
affects only the covert transmitter’s own routing and data transmission process, its
effect on the whole network is expected to be rather unnoticeable. Finding out
which node is the covert transmitter might be somewhat easier.
What the covert transmitter does for covert transmission is manipulating its
demand for routes. It is important for the covert transmitter to justify its demands
by actually using the routes. Otherwise, the destination may become suspicious
when it notices that no traffic is ever received from the route requested. The covert
transmitter has to use the routes to send some legitimate traffic. For example, the
covert transmitter may send a data query if the destination hosts a database, or
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click a couple of links if the destination hosts a website.
When a route is broken or when the covert transmitter increases its sequence
number, the covert transmitter always checks for opportunities for covert transmis-
sion. One may observe that the covert transmitter constructs more route requests
immediately after constructing a route reply as the destination. The covert trans-
mitter can combat this kind of detection by delaying the route request for a random
period of time, at the cost of smaller covert channel throughput and longer delay.
Also, without extra caution, the covert transmitter may issue route requests
at a different rate from other nodes. When the network is stable, the covert trans-
mission tends to get stuck, and the covert transmitter might issue less route requests
than the other nodes. When the network is mobile, the covert transmitter has many
excuses for covert transmissions and might issue more route requests than the other
nodes. The covert transmitter can take counter actions against this type of detec-
tion by regulating its rate of issuing route requests and keeping it close to the rates
of other nodes, possibly at the cost of decreasing covert channel throughput.
2.2.5 Covert Channels in Other Reactive Routing Protocols
As mentioned earlier, it is not only AODV that is vulnerable to covert commu-
nications. Other on demand routing protocols have similar vulnerabilities, including
most of the secure routing protocols. In this section, several other reactive routing
protocols are analyzed in terms of their vulnerability to covert attacks.
The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR [22]) protocol, in contrast to the AODV,
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uses source routing instead of hop-by-hop routing. Each packet carries, in its header,
the complete sequence of nodes that compose the route to the destination. To
reduce the cost of route discovery, nodes cache the routes that they have learned or
overheard from others. As demonstrated in [25], the aggressive caching mechanism
used by DSR brings less routing overhead, i.e. lower number of routing packets,
than that of AODV. Since in my scheme, the covert information is embedded in the
routing packets, it is expected that the covert operation does not perform as well in
DSR as in AODV.
The Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP [24]) is a hybrid routing protocol that exe-
cutes reactively within a zone of certain radius from the source, and proactively for
destinations that are not in the zone. Note that when the zone radius goes from
one hop to infinite hops, the ZRP execution mode changes from pure reactive to
pure proactive. The covert channel capacity would decrease then from some posi-
tive value to zero. The relationship between the zone radius and the covert channel
capacity is an interesting problem.
Secure routing has received increasing attention. A group of secure routing
protocols (Secure-AODV [26], Ariadne [27], SRP [28]) have been designed with the
purpose of protecting the route discovery procedures from malicious node behavior.
One general method used is to extend routing packets with digital signatures so
that the integrity and authenticity properties of the routing information are, hope-
fully, guaranteed. But, the contents of the routing packets remain the same and are
broadcast in the network unencrypted. The covert transmitter still has the freedom
of embedding covert bits into its routing packets as described before. Thus, from
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the point of view of immunity-against-covert-channel, these secure routing protocols
are not better than their nonsecured versions. What is more, the secure routing pro-
tocols generally discourage route caching and intermediate nodes replying. This in
turn encourages broadcasting of the route control packets and might result in better
performance for the covert channel. What is even worse is that the cryptographic
techniques that have been used may bring in even more covert channels. When
digital signatures are used, covert ideas similar to those in [29] also apply here.
Other secure mechanisms have been proposed without involving cryptographic
techniques in the route discovery procedures. Instead of protecting the routing
packets, the ultimate goal is to guarantee correct data packet forwarding. As long
as the route discovery procedures remain unchanged, the same covert channels can
be embedded in these protocols. In addition, cryptographic tools may still be used
for other purposes, such as to generate digital signatures [30]. The same ideas as in
[29] may apply.
The ANODR (ANonymous On Demand Routing with Untraceable Routes for
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks [11]) protocol is designed to provide “untraceable” routes
between a source and its destination. Identity of a particular transmitter is hidden
from the other nodes. Our covert operations no longer work here, because the
covert receiver can not even tell which packets are from the covert transmitter. So,
ANODR is less vulnerable to covert operations. But such immunity comes at a cost.
As shown in [11], ANODR performs worse than AODV in many aspects, including
packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, and control overheads. However, it does offer
immunity to the particular covert channel attack described here. The reduction in
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performance is the price paid to acquire this immunity.
In this section, it is discussed in detail how covert operation can be achieved
through the use of routing protocols. However, covert operation can also be im-
plemented through the use of MAC protocols. In the next section, a class of MAC
layer covert operations will be described. When the MAC layer covert channel oper-
ates conservatively, the covert operations can be absolutely undetectable. However,
by nature of the MAC layer, these covert channels have the limitation that covert
communication can only happen between nodes that are neighbors of each other.
2.3 Covert Operation through the Use of Splitting Algorithms
Nodes in ad-hoc networks have to share the wireless channel. Media Access
Control (MAC) protocols are designed to address this issue. Depending on how
the access to the channel is coordinated among active nodes, MAC protocols can
be classified as contention-free where a dedicated server/node arranges the channel
access among all the nodes in a centralized way, or contention-based where individ-
ual nodes make their own transmission decisions and resolve collisions by carefully
choosing the retransmission time.
We focus on the contention-based class of MAC protocols since it offers in-
dividual nodes more powerful control over the system. A node can embed extra
covert information into the system by controlling its own actions during the col-
lision resolution procedure. It is presented in detail how covert operation can be
implemented based on one specific class of collision resolution algorithms, referred
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to as splitting algorithms [31]. We realize that splitting algorithms have not been
used in the design of ad-hoc network MAC protocols, and in fact, they have not
been implemented yet as MAC protocols in any real application. However, there
is no serious reason why they may not be adopted in the future. In addition, the
basic idea of splitting algorithms is simple and easy to explain. They offer the best
platform to present the covert ideas described in this dissertation. These ideas can
then be incorporated in other MAC protocols in some modified form.
2.3.1 Overview of the Splitting Algorithm
Assume the classical collision channel that is slotted with instant feedback of
‘i(idle)’, ‘s(success)’, and ‘c(collision)’. Collision happens when two or more nodes
transmit in the same slot. The basic idea of a splitting algorithm is to divide collided
nodes into smaller subsets, each of which then retransmits in turn. Successive colli-
sions result in nodes splitting into smaller subsets, thus the probability of collision
happening again is reduced. This procedure continues until all the collided packets
are successfully transmitted, and this period is referred to as one collision resolution
period (CRP). Such algorithms have been intensely studied in the past [32, 33, 34].
Splitting algorithms can differ from each other in several aspects, from the
number of subsets they split into, to the handling of new arrivals during a CRP, etc.
I start from the basic form, and introduce two of the modified versions later.
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Figure 2.3: The Basic Binary Tree Algorithm
2.3.1.1 The Basic Binary Tree Algorithm
In the basic binary tree algorithm, after a collision, the competing nodes decide
independently to join one of two subsets with equal probability. Transmissions
among the two subsets are resolved in turn. Packets that arrived during the current
CRP are blocked and wait for transmission until the new CRP starts.
This procedure can be better represented by a tree structure. Fig. 2.3 shows
an example of a two-node collision. Denote the two subsets as left and right subset.
After the first collision, the two nodes happened to join the same left subset. Colli-
sion happened again which means further splitting. This time, they joined different
subsets. And two successes were observed. Coming back to the first right subset,
since there is no remaining blocked node, the channel is idle.
One important feature of this algorithm is that any node in the system can
keep track of and reconstruct the splitting tree by monitoring the channel feedback.




This improvement consists of two parts. The first part is based on the obser-
vation that if an idle is observed in the first subset’s transmission, it is guaranteed
that the second subset is going to suffer a collision. So one time slot can be saved
by splitting the second set before the actual collision occurs. Another observation
is that if the first subset suffered a collision, then the second subset is expected
to contain a small number of packets. This has motivated the second part of this
improvement: instead of coming back to resolve the second subset, the algorithm
can merge the second subset into the waiting group and work on it in the next CRP.
2.3.1.3 Improvement 2
In the basic binary tree algorithm, during a CRP, the new packet arrivals are
blocked and get to be transmitted in the beginning of the next CRP. In the event
that the previous CRP has taken a very long time, the number of waiting packets is
expected to be large. They are going to continue to collide with each other before
they are split into small enough subsets. One possible solution is to directly split
this waiting set, i.e. root of the tree, into multiple j subsets. By estimating how
many nodes are in the root set, the number j is chosen such that the expected
number of packets per subset is slightly greater than one.
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2.3.1.4 Unblocked algorithms
All the splitting algorithms described above require every node to monitor the
channel feedback and to keep track of each CRP. This is undesirable when receivers
are turned off, especially in wireless networks that strive to save battery power. One
way to avoid this disadvantage is to transmit new packets immediately in the next
slot after their arrival. This way, only currently transmitting nodes need to track
the collision resolution procedure. Since the new arrivals are no longer blocked, this
type of algorithms is called unblocked stack algorithms.
2.3.2 Covert Operations through the Use of Splitting Algorithms
Covert transmission can be realized via controlling the splitting procedure.
Upon collision, the covert transmitter decides which subset to join according to the
covert symbol it wished to transmit. For example, ‘1’ is transmitted if it joins the
left subset, and ‘0’ is transmitted if it joins the right subset. In other words, the
covert transmitter deviates from the rules followed by the other nodes but presents
legitimate behavior that would correspond to the actual protocol rules. Its deci-
sions, unknown to anyone else, are actually based on the covert symbol it wishes to
transmit. Using the same example for the basic binary tree algorithm and assuming
that one of the two collided nodes is a covert transmitter, Fig. 2.4 demonstrates
how two covert bits “10” are transmitted in a CRP.
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Figure 2.4: Covert Operation through MAC Protocol
To receive the covert information, the covert receiver needs only to passively
monitor the channel feedback. It does not need to actively participate in the channel
access competition. In the presented example, the covert receiver detects a successful
transmission from the covert transmitter in the fourth slot. From the past channel
feedback, the covert receiver can decide that the corresponding transmitting subset
is “LR”, thus concludes that covert bits ‘1’ and ‘0’ were transmitted. This is because
any receiver can retrieve the “left”–“right” pattern in the transmission of any packet.
Given that the covert source has the same probabilistic distribution as the
random splitting process, single use of this covert channel is impossible to detect,
which makes this covert channel meet its first-priority requirement. Another obvi-
ous observation is that performance of this covert channel depends on how often the
covert transmitter transmits and how often the covert transmitter meets collisions
when transmitting. In fact, the covert transmitter can smoothly adapt its trans-
mission rate and choose to run at higher rate at the risk of been detected through
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the suspiciously atypical and aggressive transmission behavior. Three different op-
eration modes are proposed that allow the channel undetectability to be traded off
against throughput.
2.3.2.1 The Conservative Mode of Covert Operation
Assume that packet arrivals at each node are identically and independently
distributed. The covert transmitter transmits only when it has a packet to send.
The covert transmitter is different from the other nodes only in the way that it
makes its splitting decisions according to the covert source requirement instead
of the agreed-upon protocol method. Given that the covert source has the same
probabilistic distribution as the protocol splitting process, use of this covert channel
is absolutely undetectable (the used protocol rule is based on random decision or on
time of arrival —as in the FCFS version [33]— which is also random).
2.3.2.2 The Aggressive Mode of Covert Operation
One limitation of the conservative mode is that occurrence of the covert trans-
mission depends on actual packet arrivals. If no new packet has arrived at the covert
transmitter before the start of a new CRP, the covert transmitter will not be able
to do covert transmission in that CRP. The aggressive mode solves this problem
by allowing the covert transmitter to generate new packets such that the covert
transmitter can participate in each and every CRP. Under this mode, the covert
transmitter transmits a packet in the first slot of every CRP.
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Obviously, running in the aggressive mode exposes the covert transmitter in a
way that may facilitate its detection. Note that the covert receiver always remains
safe from detection.
2.3.2.3 The Strategic Mode of Covert Operation
The aggressive mode is mostly useful when the traffic is light. It is observed
that the covert transmitter’s effort is wasted if nobody collides with it. But the
covert transmitter still suffers from the high risk of exposure by transmitting those
packets. It would be more risk-throughput efficient if collisions can be guaranteed
for the extra packets transmitted. A simple strategy can be taken by letting the
covert transmitter jump into a CRP when it observes collision in the first slot of
that CRP. The covert transmitter simply pretends that it is one of the originally
collided nodes.
More complicated strategies can provide intermediate covert transmission rate
by adapting the dummy packet generation rate according to the covert transmitter’s
eagerness to transmit and its willingness to get exposed.
2.3.3 Properties of the Covert Channel in Splitting Algorithms
In this section, I summarize some of the properties of the covert channel
through the use of splitting algorithms. Performance of the covert channel is eval-
uated through simulation next in Section 2.3.5.
This covert channel is error free. Given correct channel feedback, the covert
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receiver always can successfully track the CRP.
Throughput of the covert channel depends on multiple factors. First, upon
each collision, the covert transmitter can embed at most log2s covert bits in its split
decision. The covert throughput is upper-bounded by log2s bits per slot, where s is
the number of subsets that the collided nodes are divided into. Second, the covert
transmitter has to transmit data packets to convey its covert information. At most
one packet can be transmitted in one CRP. Third, only when covert transmitter’s
data packet collides with other nodes’ transmission can the covert transmitter embed
one covert symbol into its splitting decision. The number of covert symbols sent in
one CRP is equal to the number of collisions the covert transmitter meets before
its successful transmission. So, the transmission rate also depends on the length
of the CRP. Finally, not all of the slots are devoted to solving the collisions that
involve the covert transmitter. For the rest of the time, the covert transmitter is
either waiting for its turn to transmit, or waiting for the end of the current CRP.






• fCRP is the frequency of the covert transmitter participating in CRPs;
• cCRP is the number of collisions the covert transmitter encounters in a CRP;
• lCRP is the length of the CRP;
• s is the number of subsets that collided nodes are divided into.
Based on (2.4), the following observations can be made. First, when the traffic
37
rate is low, fCRP is small and the covert throughput is limited by covert transmitter’s
data packet transmission rate. Second, when the traffic rate is very high, almost
all the users participate in each CRP. According to the results of Janssen and Jong
in [34], for large number of users, m, (2.4) can be rewritten as (2.5) below, which
indicates that the covert throughput is expected to decrease; namely, for high traffic






Overall, it is very difficult to detect this covert channel. The covert receiver
is guaranteed to be undetectable since it only passively monitors the channel to
track the collision resolution procedure. The covert transmitter is also undetectable
when it operates in the conservative mode. In fact, some splitting algorithms use
different splitting criteria. The first-come-first-serve (FCFS) algorithm [33] uses the
packet arrival times to decide which subset the packet should join in. Sagduyu and
Ephremides [35] include the node residual battery energy into its decision factors
to save the nodes’ energy and lengthen the network lifetime. Still, none of this
information is directly known to the other nodes except the owner itself. The trans-
mission decision is made by a node locally. It is unclear what factors have influenced
this decision. As a result, use of this covert channel is very difficult to detect espe-
cially when the covert source has similar distribution as the splitting decision does.
When the covert transmitter runs under the aggressive or strategic mode, its ab-
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normally active transmission could expose the use of the covert channel and its own
identity. This trade-off can be made based on the particular circumstances of each
application.
2.3.5 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the covert channel, a packet-level discrete event
simulator is developed. The covert channel performance is measured under a vari-
ety of conditions including variable number of nodes, traffic rate, covert operation
modes, and various versions of the splitting algorithm. Again, the simulation results
are only isolated data points which do not describe the covert channel completely;
the purpose here is to demonstrate quantitatively some of the covert channel char-
acteristics.
The collision resolution protocol is simulated with finite number of sources,
denoted as N . Each source can have at most one packet waiting in the middle of
a CRP and at most one other packet waiting to be transmitted in the next CRP.
Packet arrivals at each user are i.i.d. Poisson processes, with mean λ/N packets per
slot. The total average traffic rate is λ packets per slot. The performance metric of
interest is covert throughput, which is defined as the average number of covert bits
transmitted per slot.
The covert channel is implemented and evaluated based on the basic binary
tree algorithm under all the three modes. Features of the first and second im-
provements are added into the binary tree algorithm separately. The unblocked
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algorithm is implemented as in [32]. Only the conservative mode is implemented for
the variations of the binary tree algorithm.
Extra care has to be taken to implement the covert channel in the unblocked
type of algorithms, where there is no longer a clear definition of “start” and “end” of
the collision resolution periods. To correctly track the splitting history of the covert
transmitter, the covert receiver needs to know when the covert transmitter started
to transmit the packet. A practical solution is to use a specific node’s success as the
synchronization signal. The covert transmitter always starts its transmission right
after it observes a packet is successfully sent by that node. There is an advantage in
using the covert receiver’s own success, which allows the covert receiver to control the
covert transmission rate by adjusting its own transmission rate. The covert receiver
transmits valid packets upon their arrivals, and the covert transmitter joins the
collision resolution procedure right after covert receiver’s success. Dummy packets
are created when necessary.
The simulation warms up with 20 CRPs. It lasts at least 1,000,000 slots
and terminates at the end of the first CRP after the 1, 000, 000th slot, except for
the unblocked algorithm where the simulation warms up with 100 time slots and
terminates at the 1, 000, 000th slot.
Fig. 2.5 presents the covert channel performance in the binary tree algorithm
under all three described operation modes. It is consistent with the observations
made in Section 2.3.3). Light traffic implies rare collisions, and thus it holds back
covert transmission rate, especially for the conservative mode in Fig. 2.5(a). On the
other hand, with high traffic rate and large network, collisions happen frequently.
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However, large portion of time is used to resolve the collisions that do not involve
the covert transmitter. As a result, the covert throughput is not good either. The
aggressive operation mode, shown in Fig. 2.5(b), effectively improves the through-
put when the traffic is light. Meanwhile, the strategic mode does not exhibit as
significant throughput improvement in Fig. 2.5(c). This is because in the aggressive
mode, the covert transmitter not only makes use of every CRP with collisions, but
also creates collisions through its aggressive transmission. Overall, the best through-
put is obtained at high traffic rate and small number of users in the network. The
best covert throughput is about 0.3 bits/slot.
Fig. 2.6 presents the covert channel performance under different variations of
the splitting algorithms. The first improvement to the basic binary tree algorithm
does not affect the splitting tree very much except that it reduces the CRP length
by saving some slots of collisions and idleness . As a result, the covert throughput
increases. The second improvement splits the root of tree depending on how many
nodes are expected to be in the root. This improvement takes effect when the
traffic rate is high and many new arrivals occur during the last CRP. By splitting
the new arrivals immediately, extra collisions are avoided and covert transmission
is held back. In Fig. 2.6(b), the covert throughput drops steeply as the traffic rate
increases above a certain value. Fig. 2.6(c) illustrates the case of the unblocked
algorithm. It shows similar features as it does with the blocked algorithm. But the
covert throughput is not as good, especially at high traffic rate. This is the cost of
synchronization between the covert transmitter and receiver. Our synchronization





































































































































































































Figure 2.6: Covert Throughput under Various Splitting Algorithms
covert receiver before each transmission.
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2.3.6 Covert Channels in Other MAC Protocols
The splitting algorithms resolve the collision by dividing collided nodes into
smaller subsets. There are other contention based MAC protocols that resolve the
collision using different methods [36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. In the basic ALOHA protocol
[36], nodes can transmit anytime they want. If collision happens, they each wait a
random waiting period before the next attempt. Slotted ALOHA [37] improves the
channel efficiency by using slotted channel and nodes can access the channel only at
the start of a slot. The CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access) technique allows a
node to avoid some of the collisions by sensing the channel for on-going transmission
[38]. If the channel is already in use, the node will back off its transmission for a ran-
dom period of time. The MACA (Medium Access Collision Avoidance) protocol [39]
proposes a virtual sensing technology by using the RTS and CTS (Request-to-Send
and Clear-to-Send) control packets. When the RTS packets from two or more nodes
collide, each collided node adopts a random exponential back-off scheme. The IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol uses both physical sensing and virtual sensing technologies
[40]. Upon collision, the random back-off time at each node is determined by the
DCF (Distributed Coordination Function).
One common idea behind these protocols is that the retransmission decisions
are made randomly by each individual node involved in the collision. Similar covert
operations can be implemented by manipulating the retransmission decisions. Re-
ception of the covert information is possible by observing the channel and the trans-
missions made by the covert transmitter. For example, covert information can be
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conveyed through manipulating the channel idle period preceding the covert trans-
mitter’s transmission. The covert transmitter transmits a data packet only when
the channel has been idle for a particular period of time which is determined by
the covert symbol to transmit. Or, the covert information can be encoded in the
number of collisions observed between two successful transmissions of the covert
transmitter. The covert receiver in both examples can retrieve the covert informa-
tion by passively monitoring the channel. Variations of these MAC protocols have
been proposed to improve the back-off strategies. As long as the back-off scheme
remains distributed and random, similar covert ideas may be applied in some mod-
ified form. The resulting covert channels may have different throughput and suffer
different degrees of detectability.
2.4 Conclusion
It has been clearly demonstrated that covert communication can occur via con-
trolling ad-hoc network protocols. Performance of the covert channels depends on
various network parameters. Although the channel throughput is very poor compar-
ing to normal data communication, use of these channels are very difficult to detect.
Future investigation is necessary which includes, but is not limited to, a complete
evaluation of the proposed covert channels, including theoretical analysis to decide
the bounds on the covert channel throughput, and the design of countermeasures
against the covert attacks. We believe there is rich potential for discovering and
then exploring new covert channel attacks as well as defending against them.
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Chapter 3
An Anonymous Trapdoor for Anonymous Communication in Ad Hoc
Networks
3.1 Motivation
Privacy has always been an important real world societal issue. User privacy
in the cyberspace is needed for various reasons from enabling the e-commerce appli-
cations to supporting the freedom of speech ([3, 4, 5, 6]). Preserving privacy under
the inherently open wireless communication networks ([7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14])
has demonstrated even more challenging problems. Wireless communication is vul-
nerable to both eavesdropping and jamming due to the open wireless medium.
Specifically, traffic pattern information and/or changes in traffic pattern infor-
mation can be inferred by observing when and where a packet, encrypted or not, is
transmitted between which users. Protection of such traffic information is critical
for many sensitive applications. For example, in military applications, a sequence
of packets transmitted by the commander may indicate a forthcoming action. Or,
in a civil application, a psychiatric patient may not want to be noticed that he/she
frequently visits some medical assistance webpage. Or, two collaborating compa-
nies may want to hide the fact that they are communicating. It is the objective of
anonymous communication to conceal such traffic information from adversaries.
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Referring to the terminology introduced by Pfitzmann and Kohntopp [41],
there are three types of anonymous communication properties that can be provided:
1) Sender-anonymity, which means it is impossible to identify the sender of a par-
ticular message; 2) Receiver-anonymity, which similarly means it is impossible to
identify the receiver; 3) Sender-receiver-anonymity, which means it is impossible to
determine whether any two users in the network are communicating. For multi-hop
ad hoc networks, sender and receiver also stand for source and destination. It is
worth noting here that sender-receiver-anonymity is provided when either of the
first two kinds of anonymity is assured.
None of the routing protocols mentioned in the previous chapter support
anonymity. Routing information is carried in plain-text in both routing control
packets and data packets, because intermediate nodes need to know who is the
destination before they can decide where to forward the packets. An anonymous
routing protocol is needed which can establish and maintain the connection between
the source and destination without disclosing their identities to any other nodes, not
even to those on the relaying path.
A novel concept of anonymous trapdoor has been utilized in most of the cur-
rent wireless anonymous communication schemes ([11, 7, 13]) to hide the receiver
identities. An anonymous trapdoor is a special token generated by a trapdoor func-
tion. The function is difficult to invert unless you are the designated receiver who
has some secret information related to the trapdoor. In other words, only the des-
ignated receiver can open the trapdoor. Being anonymous further requires that the
other users not only cannot open the trapdoor, but neither can they recognize who
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does have the capability. By substituting the receiver ID in a packet with an anony-
mous trapdorr that only the receiver can open, a packet can be broadcast locally
without specifying in clear-text who the receiver is. Similarly, the destination ID in
the route request can be replaced with an anonymous trapdoor for the destination.
Note that when a user receives a route request, it does not have to know exactly
who is the requested destination, but only need to decide whether it is the destina-
tion itself. Any user except the destination will realize that it is not the destination
when it fails to open the trapdoor, but cannot decide who is the destination. Such
anonymous trapdoor can be implemented with cryptographic functions. The cost
of constructing and opening the trapdoors depends on the type of cryptographic
functions available at the application layer.
A novel trapdoor construction is proposed in this chapter. Construction of the
trapdoor is based on a simple adaptation of the secret handshake scheme introduced
in [42], which is reviewed next.
3.2 Cryptographic Primitives
This section introduces those cryptographic primitives utilized for construction




A hash function H(x) transforms an input string x, which can have any length,
to a fixed-size output string y. The output y is referred to as the hash value of x.
The following properties are desired for a well designed cryptographic hash function:
1) Easy to compute. 2) One way. Given an output y, it is computationally infeasible
to find some input x such that H(x)=y. 3) Collision resistant. For strong collision
resistance, it is computationally infeasible to find any two inputs that have the
same hash value. Weak collision resistance requires that given an input x1, it is
computationally infeasible to find another different input x2 such that H(x1) =
H(x2). As implied in the collision resistance requirements, a hash function does not
guarantee a one-to-one mapping between the input and output.
One major application of cryptographic hash functions is to generate message
digests. The hash function transforms a long message of arbitrary length into a much
shorter and fixed-length string, referred to as the message digest. Then expensive
cryptographic operations can be performed on the short message digest rather than
the original message to reduce computational cost. For example, computing the
digital signature for a long message of arbitrary length is a very expensive operation.
Instead of calculating the digital signature over the original message directly, it is
much more efficient to hash the message first and then calculate the digital signature
based on the short, fixed-length message digest.
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3.2.2 Trapdoor Function
Similar to hash function, trapdoor function is also a one way function that
is hard to invert unless (which makes it different from hash function) you have
some special secret information. A trapdoor function does provide one-to-one map-
ping between the input and output space although inverting the mapping requires
knowledge of the secret information.
An anonymous trapdoor further ensures that without that special secret in-
formation, not only you cannot open the trapdoor, but also you cannot tell who
can. Based on this property, a packet can be protected with a trapdoor that only
the intended receiver can open. Then the packet is broadcast to the network. While
the protected packet reaches many users, only the intended receiver can open the
trapdoor and retrieve the content of the packet. However, nobody can tell which
user is the receiver.
3.2.3 Pairing Function
Our trapdoor construction is based on pairing functions, which is a bilinear,
non-degenerate map ê : G×G → G′, where G and G′ are two groups of large prime
order q. The following properties are satisfied:
1. Bilinearity:
∀P,Q ∈ G,∀a, b ∈ Z∗q
ê(aP, bQ) = êab(P,Q)
2. Non-degeneracy: P 6= 0 ⇒ ê(P, P ) 6= 1
49
3. Computability: ê(P,Q) is efficiently computable.
In particular, modified Weil [44] pairing and Tate [45] pairing are two such
bilinear maps, for which it is also assumed that the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
(BDHP) is hard, i.e., given P, aP, bP, cP in G, it is hard to compute êabc(P, P ).
Based on the bilinearity property and the BDHP assumption, pairing function
has found increasing applications in cryptography, ranging from key agreement [46],
to identity based encryption [44], to secret handshakes [42]. In this work, pairing
function is used to implement anonymous trapdoors [47].
3.3 Pairing-based Trapdoor
3.3.1 The Bootstrapping Phase
Construction the anonymous trapdoor uses a bilinear, non-degenerate, and
computable pairing function ê : G×G → G′, for which the BDHP is assumed to be
hard. G and G′ are two groups of large prime order q. Assume there are two collision
resistance hash functions H1 and H2: H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → G and H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}β
(such as SHA-1). β is a fixed integer that represents the length of the output hash
value. The 6-tuple < q,G,G′, ê, H1, H2 > is public known to every user.
The system administrator picks a random number t ∈ Z∗q and declares it to
be the system secret. Then, the administrator equips each user i with a set of
paired values: {< PsdNymi,j, tH1(PsdNymi,j) >, forj = 1, 2, . . . m}, where the
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PsdNymi,j’s are one-time-use pseudonyms of user i, and tH1(PsdNymi,j) is the
secret point corresponding to PsdNymi,j. The set is of size m. In addition to the
pseudonyms, the administrator also equips each user i with a unique identity and
the corresponding secret point: < IDi, tH1(IDi) >.
Before entering the network, each user i is initiated with the following public
information < q,G,G′, ê, H1, H2 >, and the following private information < IDi,
tH1(IDi) > and {< PsdNymi,j, tH1(PsdNymi,j) >, forj = 1, 2, . . . m}. However,
user does not know the value of system secret t.
Denote x1 ‖ x2 as concatenation of string x1 and x2. Encryption of x us-
ing the key K is represented as K(x), and decryption is represented as K−1(x).
Construction of the proposed pairing-based trapdoor is described in the following
section.
3.3.2 Pairing-based Trapdoor Construction
Now let us consider Alice as the source who wants to communicate with Bob.
Alice needs to find a path to Bob and may have to rely on other users on the path to
relay her packets. On one hand, Alice does not want them know who she is and who
she is communicating with. On the other hand, the other users need to know where
to forward Alice’s packet. Alice establishes such a path by using a pseudonym for
herself and hiding Bob’s identity in the anonymous trapdoor.
Alice first picks an unused pseudonym PsdNymAlice and constructs the trap-
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door as follows:





CNymAlice,Bob = H2(ê(tH1(PsdNymAlice), H1(IDBob)) ‖ 0)
KAlice,Bob = H2(ê(tH1(PsdNymAlice), H1(IDBob)) ‖ 1).
(3.2)
The second part of the trapdoor,CNymAlice,Bob, is the pseudonym for the con-
nection between Alice and Bob. The connection pseudonym and the secret key
KAlice,Bob bind the source pseudonym with the destination ID through the pairing
function. Such a binding can only be recognized by the destination. Both the
connection pseudonym and the secret key have to be calculated with either Alice’s
secret point related to her pseudonym or Bob’s secret point related to his identity.
A third party cannot guess the value of KAlice,Bob. In addition, although the connec-
tion pseudonym CNymAlice,Bob is public, nobody can tell that it is related to Bob’s
identity. For a user other than the source and destination, he can at most determine
that the trapdoor cannot be opened by himself but cannot obtain any information
about who can.
Recalling the on-demand routing mechanism described in chapter 2, upon
receiving a route request, a user checks the destination ID entry. If the user is the
destination or knows of a path to the destination, the user constructs and sends
back reply. Otherwise, he rebroadcasts the request. Both of the destination ID and
source ID are carried in plain-text. To anonymize the route request packet, these
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entries can be replaced by an anonymous trapdoor like Eq. 3.1. Then the trapdoor-
protected route request is broadcast throughout the network. An intermediate user
who received the request cannot open the trapdoor, thus will continue to forward
the route request. When the route request arrives at the destination Bob, Bob will
be able to open the trapdoor and respond as the destination. Since intermediate
users do not know who is inquired in the route request, they can no longer generate
replies even if they do have routes to the destination. In the next subsection, the
procedure of opening an trapdoor is described.
3.3.3 Open Trapdoor
When a user X receives a route request, it first checks whether it has seen the
request before, for example by checking whether it has seen the source pseudonym
before. If so, this request is ignored and discarded. Otherwise, user X takes as
inputs the source pseudonym and its own secret point, and calculates:
CNymPsdNymAlice,X = H2(ê(H1(PsdNymAlice), tH1(IDX)) ‖ 0) (3.3)
If user X is not the requested destination, the connection pseudonym calculated
using X’s secret point will not equal to the connection pseudonym carried in the route
request:
CNymPsdNymAlice,X = H2(ê(H1(PsdNymAlice), tH1(IDX)) ‖ 0)
= H2(ê(tH1(PsdNymAlice), H1(IDX)) ‖ 0)





When destination Bob receives the route request, he will try to open the
trapdoor just like any other users:





Bob finds out that the connection pseudonym he calculates is equal to the
one carried in the route request. Bob further confirms that he is the requested
destination by calculating the secret key:
KPsdNymAlice,Bob = H2(ê(H1(PsdNymAlice), tH1(IDBob)) ‖ 1)




Bob gets the same secret key that was used to encrypt the third part of the
trapdoor. Bob can successfully decrypt it can find its own ID in the decrypted
content. So Bob confirms that he is the destination and should send back a route
reply. For any user X who is not Bob, given
< PsdNymAlice, CNymAlice,Bob, KAlice,Bob(IDBob) >,
user X cannot learn any information about IDBob except that it is not his own
identity IDX .
3.3.4 Proof of Opening Trapdoor
When secure routing is desired, a proof of opening the trapdoor shall be pro-
vided in the route reply, such that the source can verify the route reply is indeed
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created by the destination. A simple proof can be calculated as the follows:
Proof = H2(ê(H1(PsdNymAlice), tH1(IDBob)) ‖ 2) (3.7)
However, this proof can be verified by only the source. Forged route replies
can still be injected into the network. Although the source will finally reject the
reply, propagation of the fake reply still consumes communication and computation
resources. It is more desirable if a proof can be verified by any intermediate user on
the route.
A globally verifiable proof is provided by slightly modifying the trapdoor. In




where CNym′Alice,Bob = H2(CNymAlice,Bob). Accordingly, the same hash operation
is performed when a user tries to decide if it is the destination. Because of the
one-way property of the hash function, it is difficult to find another input that
produces CNym′Alice,Bob. However, the destination user with its own secret point
can easily calculate CNymAlice,Bob just as the source did. So, the destination uses
CNymAlice,Bob as its proof of opening the trapdoor, i.e. Proof
′ = CNymAlice,Bob.
Any forwarding user who has recorded the trapdoor can verify the proof by checking
if H2(Proof
′) = CNym′Alice,Bob.
The proof of opening the trapdoor does not carry the destination identity in
plain-text, so it reserves the property of destination anonymity.
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3.4 Perfect Anonymity vs. Computational Anonymity
Recall that the anonymous trapdoor consists of the 3-tuple of <source pseudonym,
connection pseudonym, encrypted destination identity>. The anonymity property
requires that given a trapdoor, no third party beside the source and destination is
able to tell which user’s identity, out of a set of known user identities, was used to
create the trapdoor.
Anonymity of a given trapdoor construction scheme can be assessed under an
information-theoretical framework similar to the one proposed by Shannon in 1949
[48] to evaluate the secrecy of a cryptosystem. In Shannon’s framework, the secrecy
of a cryptosystem is evaluated as the amount of information about a randomly
chosen message an attacker can derive from the cipher text. A cryptosystem is
said to achieve perfect secrecy if the attack gains no information from the cipher
text. Following the same framework, anonymity of a given trapdoor construction
scheme can be assessed as the amount of information about a randomly chosen
identity (drawn out of a set of known identities with some probability distribution)
an attacker obtains after being given a trapdoor constructed using that identity.
Perfect anonymity is achieved if the no information about the destination identity
can be derived from the trapdoor.
However, perfect anonymity cannot be achieved using our trapdoor construc-
tion scheme. Theoretically, the trapdoor contains all the necessary information to
calculate the destination identity. (For example, the destination identity can be
found by performing a brute force search through all possible combinations of user
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identities and integers s ∈ Z∗q and finding the pair which, combined with the source
pseudonym, generates the same trapdoor.) A more practical goal is to make sure it
is computationally infeasible to do so.
The same problem exists for the notion of perfect secrecy. In fact, achieving
perfect secrecy under this information theoretical model has been proved impractical[48].
It requires that for every bit of information to be exchanged secretly, one bit of shared
secret information is already established between the communication parties. No
practical method has been found which can generate, exchange, and store such large
amount of secret information. Insteads, security of a practical encryption scheme
usually relies on the hardness of some well-known mathematical problems: for which
no polynomial time solution is known (yet). By showing that the problem of break-
ing the cryptosystem can be reduced to solving the hard mathematical problem, it is
proved to be computationally infeasible to recover the key and the original message.
3.5 Anonymous Authentication and Key Establishment
Two notable side benefits of our trapdoor construction are automatic anony-
mous authentication and key establishment. Alice and Bob agree on the same
secret key KAlice,Bob (Bob calculates KPsdNymAlice,Bob which is equal to KAlice,Bob) if
and only if both Alice and Bob are legitimate users who have obtained their secret
points from the system administrator. Intractability of the BDHP ensures that given
a collection of pseudonyms and the corresponding secret points, the system secret
t can not be deduced with non-negligible probability. Without knowing the system
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secret t, it is hard to find pseudonym and the corresponding secret point that can
the confirmation. In the mean time, Alice and Bob have established a shared secret
key, KAlice,Bob, for future transactions.
3.6 Related Work
3.6.1 Secret Handshakes
The proposed anonymous trapdoor is based on a simple adaptation of the
secret handshake protocols [42]. The pairing function together with one-time user
pseudonyms are used to perform secret handshakes. The secret handshake allows two
users to authenticate each other as valid group members and set up a shared secret
key after exchanging their pseudonyms. User pseudonyms are randomly generated
independent of the user real identities and each pseudonym is used only once so
that it is impossible to link a pseudonym to the user’s real identity or to relate two
pseudonyms to the same user. An authenticated and secure communication channel
is established between two users without disclosing their real identities to anyone,
not even to each other.
However, the secret handshake requires exchange of messages in both direc-
tions before the secret key can be calculated by both users. The two users have to
exchange their pseudonyms before the shared secret key can be established. As a
result, although the secret handshake scheme provides powerful anonymity proper-
ties, it cannot be applied directly for the problem of anonymous multi-hop routing.
On one hand, the source needs to find a path and establish the connection to the
58
destination before any message can be exchanged. On the other hand, at least two,
the source and destination pseudonyms, have to be exchanged before the connection
can be established. This results in the chicken and egg problem. The proposed new
anonymous trapdoor breaks this loop by replacing the destination pseudonym used
during key calculation with its real identities so that messages only need to be passed
in one direction: from the source to the destination, which is done through broad-
cast. The one-time source pseudonym is kept to protect both source anonymity.
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Chapter 4
Anonymous Authentication with Distributed Anonymity Revocation
4.1 Motivation
Chapter 3 has described a new anonymous trapdoor construction scheme based
on pairing functions. With the new trapdoor, it is possible to establish an anony-
mous communication connection between a pair of users in the wireless network.
Unfortunately, anonymity can be misused. A compromised user can abuse
anonymity and launch malicious attacks without being detected. The same is true
for a selfish user. Even if the misbehavior is detected, since it is conducted under
pseudonyms, the attacker or selfish user can dodge detection and continue its action
by simply switching to new pseudonyms. On the other hand, most misbehavior
detection and responding schemes ([49, 50, 51, 52]) depend on accountability. Ac-
countability ensures that events of interest can be connected to specific users such
that responsibility can be assigned if something goes wrong. Without accountability,
it would be impossible to know who caused the observed or suspected malfunction
and what counteractions should be taken against whom in order to contain the
damage.
Obviously, anonymity and accountability are two conflicting properties by def-
inition. Existing anonymous communication schemes combat this problem by re-
voking anonymity when misbehavior is detected. Revocation of anonymity depends
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on an assumed existence of centralized authorities(CA), who maintain the map-
ping between user identity and user pseudonyms. When evidence of misbehavior is
presented, the real identity behind the pseudonyms is recovered and all the related
pseudonyms are revoked. Availability of an on-line CA is critical for instant intruder
identification.
However, in ad hoc networks, it cannot always be assumed that such a central-
ized control is constantly available. Users may obtain their anonymous credentials
from the CA before joining the ad hoc network. It is inappropriate to assume that
users can keep constant access to the CA. Current anonymous communication pro-
tocols for ad hoc networks, ANODR [11] and MASK [14] for example, either do not
support anonymity revocation at all or rely on some centralized control to do so.
For example, ANODR users generate their own uncertified pseudonyms which are
absolutely unlinkable to their real identities. Better accountability is provided in
MASK, as neighboring users authenticate each other under pseudonyms generated
by a trusted authority. The trusted authority maintains a list of pseudonyms asso-
ciated with each individual user. Later if a pseudonym is detected misbehaving, the
trusted authority can link it to the particular user. The trusted authority revokes
the anonymity of a user by broadcasting the complete list of its pseudonyms to the
entire network. However, it cannot always be assumed that such a trusted authority
is constantly available, in which case it is crucial for the network nodes to be able
to identify the misbehaving nodes by themselves and take proper counteractions.
Furthermore, maintaining the long list of revoked pseudonyms is expensive both
communication-wise and storage-wise.
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In this chapter, I describe an anonymous authentication architecture with
distributed anonymity revocation. The anonymity revocation protocol does not
depend on the existence of any on-line trusted third parties. Instead, given enough
information about a user’s pseudonyms, anybody can revoke the anonymity of that
user. Assume that each user has a unique identity. Based on the cryptographic
concept of threshold secret sharing, user pseudonyms are generated by decomposing
the user identity using the threshold secret sharing scheme([53, 54]). Anybody
collecting enough pseudonyms of a given user can recover that user’s identity, and
thus revoke the user’s anonymity.
Once the identity of a user is recovered and distributed, all the pseudonyms
of the user, used or unused, are automatically revoked due to the fact that they
contribute to the same identity. This is an obvious advantage over the traditional
solutions, where a long revocation list has to be maintained for all the arbitrarily-
unlinkable pseudonyms.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, an existing anonymous au-
thentication scheme, called secret handshakes, is introduced. The secret handshake
scheme was already mentioned briefly in the previous chapter as related works. This
section provides a more detailed description of the secret handshake protocol, based
on which a new anonymous authentication protocol with distributed anonymity re-
vocation is proposed. The basic idea behind the design is explained in Section 4.3.
A new cryptographic primitive, the threshold secret sharing scheme, is also intro-
duced in Section 4.3. It is described in detail in Section 4.4 the new anonymous
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authentication with distributed anonymity revocation protocol. Its properties with
regard to anonymity and accountability is analyzed in Section 4.5. Related work
is reviewed in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes this chapter with a summary and
some pointers to future work.
4.2 Secret Handshakes
Our anonymous authentication is based on an existing anonymous authenti-
cation protocol, referred to as the secret handshake scheme [42]. Here, we briefly
review the secret handshake scheme.
The secret handshake schemes in [42] are realized based on the same pairing-
based cryptography that is already introduced in Chapter 3.2. The system is set
up very similarly to that for the trapdoor constructions. The system administrator
first generates a set of public parameters < q,G,G′, ê, H1, H2 >, which is known by
every user. The system administrator picks a random number t ∈ Z∗q and declares
it to be the system secret. Then, the administrator equips each user i with a set
of {< PsdNymi,j, tH1(PsdNymi,j) >, forj = 1, 2, . . . m}, where PsdNymi,j’s are
again one-time-use pseudonyms of user i, and tH1(PsdNymi,j) is the corresponding
secret point. The difference is that for mutual anonymous authentication, users do
not necessarily have to have the secret point related to their real identities.
Let Alice and Bob be two users who wish to authenticate each other. The secret
handshake proceeds as follows. Alice and Bob each pick an unused pseudonymous
credentials, denoted as < PsdNymAlice, tH1(PsdNymAlice) > and
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< PsdNymBob, tH1(PsdNymBob) > .




2. Bob recieves Alice’s pseudonym and calculates the secret value
SBob = ê(H1(PsdNymAlice), tH1PsdNymBob). (4.1)
Bob picks another random nonce nounceBob and calculates
V0 = H2(SBob||PsdNymAlice||PsdNymBob||nounceAlice||nounceBob||0).
(4.2)




3. Alice receives Bob’s pseudonym and calculates












4. Bob confirms that
V1 = H2(SBob||PsdNymAlice||PsdNymBob||nounceAlice||nounceBob||1).
(4.6)
Notice that the secret value SAlice is equal to SBob, if and only if both Alice
and Bob are legitimate users who have obtained their secret points from the system
administrator. Denote this common secret value as SAlice,Bob. Various security
properties of the secret handshakes have been proved in [42]. For more details,
please refer to the original paper. Now, Alice and Bob can set up a shared secret
key for future transactions as
KAlice,Bob = H2(SAlice,Bob||PsdNymAlice||PsdNymBob||nounceAlice||nounceBob||2).
(4.7)
4.3 Basic Idea and the Threshold Secret Sharing
The secret handshake scheme described earlier allows two users to authenticate
each other secretly. An eavesdropper observing the authentication process cannot
learn anything, including the identities of the two parties. Many proposals have
utilized this property of secret handshakes for anonymous communications, such
as MASK [14]. The strong anonymity property was achieved through the use of
arbitrarily-unlinkable pseudonyms during the secret handshakes.
Instead, I propose to construct user pseudonyms with certain embedded rela-
tionship. Given enough information, this relationship can be rediscovered and used
to link all the related pseudonyms together. I will show that such pseudonyms can
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be constructed using the threshold secret sharing scheme, which is introduced in the
next section.
The new anonymous authentication architecture still allows users to authenti-
cate each other under the pseudonyms. Upon joining the network, each user obtains
a set of secret points corresponding to their pseudonyms. The secret points are calcu-
lated according to the secret handshake scheme[42]. Following the secret handshake
procedure in [42], two users can successfully authenticate each other and establish a
shared secret key, if and only if both of them have obtained their pseudonyms and
the secret points from the system administrator.
The new anonymous authentication architecture provides strong anonymity
against eavesdroppers. Two rounds of secret handshakes are performed during the
authentication procedure. The second secret handshake is performed only if the first
handshake is successful. Exchange of messages during the second secret handshake
is protected with the key established during the first handshake. This ensures that
anybody observing the authentication procedure can obtain only part of the user
pseudonyms, which does not help to recover the user identity.
The new anonymous authentication architecture ensures that even if a user’s
identity is already discovered by the adversaries, its transactions with other benign
users remain anonymous. In other words, although the user may be recognized
when directly interacting with an adversary, its transactions with other benign users
remain unrecognizable to the adversary.
We introduce the threshold secret sharing scheme next.
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4.3.1 Threshold secret sharing
In order to be able to recover the user identity from its pseudonyms, there must
be certain relationship embedded in these pseudonyms. Given enough information,
this relationship can be rediscovered and used to link all the related pseudonyms
together. Such pseudonyms can be constructed based on the threshold secret sharing
scheme proposed by Shamir[53] in 1979. The original application was robust key
management for crypto-systems. The basic idea is that given a piece of secret
information, such as the user identity, construct n related pieces, generally referred
to as secret shares, such that:
1. any k out of the n pieces will reveal the secret, but
2. any k − 1 or fewer pieces are not enough for reconstructing the secret.
Shamir’s scheme is perfect, in the sense that any fewer than the threshold
number of shares reveals absolutely no information about the secret [54]. Now we
review the scheme in more details.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is based on interpolation of a polynomial de-
fined over a finite field, GF (p), where p is a large prime number. Given k points
in the two dimensional plane, (xi, yi) for i = 1, 2, ..., k, there is a unique polynomial
F k−1(xi) of degree k−1 such that F
k−1(xi) = yi for all i. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that the secret D is an element in GF (p). A (k, n) threshold secret
sharing scheme works as follows:
1. pick a random k − 1st degree polynomial F k−1(x):
F k−1(x) = ak−1x
k−1 + ak−2x
k−2 + ... + a1x
1 + a0 (4.8)
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where a0 is the secret D. So, F
k−1(0) = a0 = D.
2. the n shares Di = (xi, yi) are calculated by evaluating F
k−1(x) at n distinct
points xi, xi 6= 0:
Di = (xi, yi) = (xi, F
k−1(xi)) (4.9)
Given any subset of k of these Di pairs, it is computationally easy to solve for
a0 = D in Eq. (4.8). Knowledge of k − 1 pairs, however, does not suffice in order
to calculate D. In fact, no subset of fewer than k shares can determine any partial
information about the secret.
One observation to be made here is that a secret share is actually composed of
a pair of values, i.e. the input value x and the polynomial evaluated at x . Without
the second part, the value of x alone does not carry any information about the
secret. With some careful design, this fact is utilized in our authentication protocol
to ensure anonymity. More details will be provided with the formal introduction of
the authentication protocol in section 4.4.
4.4 The AADAR Protocol
4.4.1 Pseudonym generation
In the bootstrapping phase, the SA first determines a pair of public and private
keys < PubK, PrvK >, two groups G and G′ of the same prime order q, a Weil/Tate
pairing mapping function ê, and two collision resistant hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗ →
G and H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}β. Then, SA picks a system secret t. In the end, each
node has the knowledge of < PubK, q,G,G′, ê, H1, H2 >, but does not know the
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value of the private key PrvK or the system secret t.
For each user, say Alice as an example, the SA generates a certificate for
her identity IDAlice : cert(IDAlice) = {IDAlice}PrvK , where {IDAlice}PrvK denotes
IDAlice signed by key PrvK. Then, the TA picks a random polynomial of or-
der k − 1: F k−1Alice(x) = aAlice,k−1x
k−1 + aAlice,k−2x
k−2 + ... + aAlice,1x + aAlice,0 and
aAlice,0 = cert(IDAlice).





































Alice,i) is the secret point corre-





Alice presents only PsdNym
(1)
Alice,i during the first secret handshake. If and
only if the first secret handshake was successful, Alice transmits PsdNym
(2)
Alice,i en-





Alice,i is verified if the second secret handshake is suc-
cessful. The random value PsdNym
(1)
∗,∗ of two users shall not collide. Otherwise,
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∗,∗ obviously belong to different users. In the next subsection, it
is described how anonymous authentication is realized under the pseudonyms.
4.4.2 Anonymous Authentication
The anonymous authentication protocol consists of two rounds of secret hand-
shakes. Two users authenticate each other by exchanging pseudonyms. It is im-
portant to have two rounds of secret handshakes in order to ensure anonymity.
Notice that anybody having enough shares of the pseudonyms can recover the user
identity. Exchange of the pseudonyms must be protected from arbitrary eaves-
droppers. With the two-round mechanism, only part of the pseudonym is sub-
ject to eavesdropping during the first handshake. Once two users establish the
shared secret key, exchange of the remaining part of the pseudonym can be pro-
tected by encryption. Assume Alice and Bob are the two users who want to au-



















The superscripts ‘(1)’ and ‘(2)’ are used to distinguish messages exchanged in the
























Figure 4.1: AADAR: The First Round of Secret Handshake









Bob,j > and follows the same procedure as the original scheme









1 are values calculated by Bob
and Alice according to their secret points, each to be verified by the other party.






































































1 are successfully confirmed, Alice and Bob know that they
possess the same secret key K
(1)
Alice,Bob. This key is used during the second secret





























Figure 4.2: AADAR: The Second Round of Secret Handshake
The second handshake proceeds as demonstrated in Fig. 4.2 K
(1)
Alice,Bob{·}









0 , and V
(2)
1 have similar meaning as above. Another shared secret value S
(2)
Alice,Bob




















































Validity of the whole pseudonyms is confirmed if and only if both V
(2)
0 and
V1(2) are successfully verified. Just like the first secret handshake, Alice and Bob
72


















As discussed earlier, anonymity can be misused. Some traditional security
solutions, such as ([49, 50, 51, 52]), no longer work when anonymity is enforced.
This is because these solutions rely on accountability, which is incompatible with
anonymity by definition. To combat this problem, we propose a scheme that offers
distributed anonymity revocation when misbehavior is detected. In our scheme,
identity of a misbehaving node can be recovered once it is caught misbehaving more
than a certain number of times (in this case, the secret sharing threshold k).
In our scheme, each user in the system maintains two blacklists : one list
of misbehaving pseudonyms and another list of revoked identities. Each entry
in the list of revoked identities is also associated with the corresponding polyno-
mial F (k−1)(·) used to decomposed that identity. Without loss of generality, as-





Bob,j >, which is also a share of Bob’s real identity. Alice
adds this share to the list of misbehaving pseudonyms she has maintained. When
this list is of size at least k, Alice can try to recover the real identity of misbe-
having nodes by running the polynomial interpolation with every combination of k
pseudonyms. If the reconstructed secret does not form a valid certificate, i.e. not in
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the form of cert(IDX), Alice decides that these k pseudonyms do not belong to the
same user. Otherwise, Alice determines that a misbehaving user X with identity
IDX is recovered. The corresponding polynomial F
k−1
X (·) is also reconstructed from
the pseudonyms. Alice adds the IDX and the polynomial F
k−1
X (·) into the list of
revoked identities.






number of polynomial interpolations. Obviously, as z grows, the
number of polynomial interpolations to be performed is O(zk). However, we expect
z to be bounded by (k − 1) · Nadversary + Ninnocent, where Nadversary is the number
of adversaries in the network and Ninnocent is the number of innocent pseudonyms
mistakenly observed as misbehaving. We also observe that when one identity is
recovered, all the related pseudonyms can be removed from the list. Thus the list
of misbehaving pseudonyms contains only the suspected pseudonyms of those users
whose identity has not been recovered yet.
To prevent the identified adversaries from further participating in the network
operation, Alice has to verify that a pseudonym < PsdNym(1), PsdNym(2) > does
not belong to one of the identified adversaries. This can be realized by ensuring:
1. < PsdNym(1), PsdNym(2) > is not already in the list of misbehaving pseudonyms
2. ∀ID in the list of identified adversaries,
PsdNym(2) 6= F k−1ID (PsdNym
(1)). (4.16)
Our anonymity revocation scheme ensures that once the identity of a node is
recovered, all of its pseudonyms, used or unused, can be linked together. This offers
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an efficient system for anonymity revocation in comparison with other solutions
where a long revocation list has to be maintained for all the arbitrarily-unlinkable
pseudonyms.
4.4.4 Blacklist Exchange
Ad-hoc network users are mobile users. So are the adversaries. A single honest
user may have not collected enough pseudonyms of a given adversary before it moves
away. A smart adversary may dodge identification by carefully “distributing” its
attacks across the whole network, while never leaving enough evidence to one single
honest user.
A smart adversary can also prevent identification by reusing its pseudonyms
to limit the disclosure of its pseudonyms. Our two-level authentication scheme has
been designed to prevent an adversary from forging pseudonyms. However, used
pseudonyms are valid ones that can be reused to authenticate adversaries without
any trouble. A given user can only refuse to authenticate a pseudonym that is
already on its own blacklist, while the adversary can cheat different users under the
same pseudonym. The adversary’s identity remains undiscovered even if every user
in the network has detected it misbehaving under that single same pseudonym.
Both of the problems can be solved through sharing the lists of misbehaving
pseudonyms and revoked identities. This allows more effective adversary identifi-
cation and prevent pseudonym reuse by the adversary. Each time a user detects a
misbehaving pseudonym, it can inform other users by broadcasting a revoke mes-
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sage.
It is important to ensure authenticity of the revoke messages. Distribution of
bogus revoke messages with invalid pseudonyms consumes not only communication
but also computation resources. Any identity reconstruction effort involving invalid
pseudonyms will be unsuccessful. We propose to employ Paterson’s ID-based sig-
nature scheme [55] as a simple extension of the original protocol. The following
additional operations are performed by the SA during the bootstrapping phase:
1. Picks an element P ∈ G and calculates Ppub = tP .
2. Chooses another collision-resistant hash function
H3 : G → {0, 1}
β.
3. Makes < P,Ppub,H3 > known to every user.
The revoke message in our scheme has the format of
< REV OKE, [PsdNymreporter, PsdNymmisbehaver]PsdNymreporter >
PsdNymmisbehaver is the reported misbehaving pseudonym. PsdNymreporter
is the pseudonym of the reporter. [M ]ID stands for signing message M using the
identity ID. The signature is a pair of value (R,S). To generate the signature, user




R = k · P
S = k−1(H2(M) · P + H3(R) · tH1(ID))
(4.17)
To verify that (R,S) is a valid signature generated by user ID for M , the
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verifier confirms that
ê(R,S) = ê(k · P, k−1(H2(M) · P + H3(R) · tH1(ID)))
= ê(P,H2(M) · P + H3(R) · tH1(ID))
= ê(P, P )H2(M) · ê(Ppub,H1(ID)
H3(R) (4.18)
Furthermore, to prevent the reporter from injecting fake misbehaving pseudonyms
into the blacklist. Authenticity of the PsdNymmisbehavior also needs to be verified.
This can be enabled by attaching a signature on PsdNymmisbehavior generated by
PsdNymmisbehavior itself. Such a signature can be obtained during the anonymous
authentication procedure. Two users may exchange their self-generated signatures
on their own pseudonyms right after the second secret handshake is successfully
performed.
4.4.5 Packet-based Pseudonyms
After the two secret handshakes, Alice and Bob can securely communicate
with each other using their pseudonyms and the secret key. However, the same
pseudonyms will link together all the communications and transactions between
Alice and Bob. The same approach of MASK[14] can be adopted to ensure unlinka-
bility between two packets or two transactions. Alice and Bob calculate a sequence




























Alice,Bob denote the γ
th pseudonymous identifier





is used for every packet transmitted or transaction performed between Alice and
Bob. The maximum number of such pairs should be small enough such that the
probability of collision is negligible.
4.5 Discussion
In this subsection, I will discuss some properties of the protocol, design choices,
and several enhancements.
4.5.1 Two Rounds of Secret Handshakes
It can be immediately observed that during the first handshake, Alice and
Bob used only parts of their pseudonyms, which are absolutely-unlinkable random
numbers in G. An eavesdropper who overhears these cannot obtain any information
about user identities. For the second handshake, exchange of the remaining parts of





Alice,Bob is particularly linked to Alice and Bob, nobody else can obtain
the key or the pseudonyms. The authentication procedure is anonymous against
eavesdroppers who can be either outsiders or compromised insiders.
It is more complicated when one of Alice and Bob is compromised, say Bob.
Bob can recover Alice’s identity by repeatedly performing authentication with Alice
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for at least k different pseudonyms of Alice. From then on, whenever Alice authen-
ticates with Bob, Bob can link the pseudonyms to Alice. As a result, Bob can link
all his own authentication experiences with Alice. However, Bob also discloses his
own pseudonyms and risks his own privacy.
On the other hand, our scheme is more robust than it first appears. In fact,
communications and transactions between benign users remain anonymous even if
one or both of their identities have been recovered by the adversaries. Again, this
is because of the two-round secret handshake mechanism. For example, the secret
handshake procedure between Alice and Carl remains unrecognizable to Bob, even
if he has recovered the identities of both Alice and Carl. Our scheme ensures robust
anonymity of communications and transactions within the group of benign users.
4.5.2 Distributed Adversary Identification
As recognized above, the fact that an internal spy may recover user’s identities
posts threats against the system anonymity. This problem can be alleviated by
further dividing the capability of re-identification across the network users. First,
every pseudonym is encrypted before loaded to users. Secret points are calculated
from the encrypted pseudonyms correspondingly. The encrypted pseudonyms have
to be decrypted before being used to reconstruct the user identity. Then, according
to the schemes of [56] or [57], the decryption capability can be shared by the network
users such that it requires the cooperation of a minimum number of users to decrypt
the pseudonyms. Assume that the minimum number is D. Now, a user has to
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convince at least another D − 1 users to help it decrypt a misbehaving pseudonym.
The user can do so by presenting evidence of misbehaviors. Honest users refuse to
help the decryption unless proper evidence is provided. As a result, it requires that
at least D users to be compromised in order to decrypt the pseudonyms and recover
other users’ identities.
However, extra care has to be taken to ensure the distributed decryption pro-
cedure does not introduce new breaches of anonymity. We suggest a separate set of
identities, unlinkable to the ones for data communication, to be used for the purpose
of distributed decryption.
4.5.3 Threshold
One important property of our scheme is the flexible trade-off between anonymity
and accountability through adjusting the design parameter k. On one hand, a given
adversary may be identified if it has been caught misbehaving at least k time. The
smaller k is, the sooner an adversary can be identified. On the other hand, spies can
recover the real identity of honest users, once they obtain at least k pseudonyms of a
given user. The smaller k is, the easier for spies to breach the user anonymity. More-
over, benign users may be mistaken as misbehavers, for reasons such as dynamic
channel status. The number of unwanted identification of benign users increases as
k decreases, and vice versa. The proper value of k should be determined according
to the application requirements. Larger k is preferred for privacy sensitive applica-




As users are preloaded with limited number of pseudonyms, they either have
to reuse their pseudonyms, or there will be a time when a user has to go back to the
trusted authority to be reloaded with a fresh set of pseudonyms. Note that although
each user having access to its own pseudonyms may reconstruct the polynomial func-
tion and generate pseudonyms for themselves, they much obtain the corresponding
secret points from the SA. Without the corresponding secret points, users can no
longer be authenticated using the pseudonyms. This prevents a compromised user
from introducing arbitrary pseudonyms into the system.
There are two options when constructing the new set of pseudonyms:
1. A new random polynomial of order k − 1 is picked for the same secret, and
the new set of pseudonyms is calculated using this new polynomial.
2. The same polynomial is used, but it is evaluated at different random points.
The major difference between these two options is whether the new pseudonyms
can be combined with the old ones when reconstructing the user identity. Option 1)
suggests that a different polynomial is used, so the new set of pseudonyms cannot
be combined with the old ones. Option 2) is the opposite case. A disadvantage
of option 1) is that an adversary can dodge detection by reloading its pseudonyms
whenever k − 1 pseudonyms from the same set are used. Option 2) prevents this
problem, but provides less confidence in users’ anonymity. A spy who has collected
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any k pseudonyms of the same user can recover the user’s real identity. On the other
hand, option 1) requires the spy to collect at least k pseudonyms from the same set.
And more importantly, with option 1), an exposed user regains anonymity once it
gets reloaded with the new set of pseudonyms.
Which option to take depends on the interests of the actual applications.
In applications where protecting anonymity is more important than detection of
misbehaving users, option 1) is preferred, while the opposite is true for option 2).
4.5.5 An example application of Secure and anonymous routing
In this section, we discuss an example application our anonymous authen-
tication architecture to provide secure and anonymous routing in ad-hoc wireless
networks. We consider the case when compromised or selfish users agree to forward
the data packets but fail to so. It is critical to detect such misbehaviors under all
the constraints of anonymous communication.
Without anonymity in consideration, a group of secure routing protocols ([49,
51, 52]) have been designed to defend agaisnt such misbehaviors. The so-called
Watchdog mechanism is initially proposed in [51], and later extended in ([49, 58].
The basic idea is based on the use of passive acknowledgment (PACK): a node
can confirm that its neighbor has received a packet by overhearing it forwarding
that packet. However, this PACK mechanism cannot be applied to anonymous
communications. This is because to ensure anonymity, hop-by-hop encryptions are
generally applied to the packets to prevent transmission of the packet from being
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traced according to its payloads. This prevents a node from being able to monitor
its neighbors’ transmissions.
Solutions proposed in ([52, 59]) makes use of active acknowledgments and re-
ports. HADOF[52] is based on the source routing protocol DSR [22]. Source in
HADOF collects traffic statistic reports from the intermediate users in order to de-
tect misbehaving users on the route. On the other hand, the secure data forwarding
(SDF) scheme [59] is based on the distance-vector routing protocol AODV [21]. In
SDF, the destination generates ACKs that can be verified by the source and every
intermediate user. For every packet, if the source or an intermediate user receives
neither the destination ACK nor a misbehaving report from its downstream within
a certain amount of time, it will generate a misbehaving report about its downlink
and send it upstream to the source. When the source detects its own downlink
misbehaving or receives a misbehaving report from the downstream, the source can
issue a new secure route request avoiding the misbehaving users. Because SDF does
not rely on source routing, which is the case for most anonymous routing protocols,
we suggest employing SDF as the misbehavior detection mechanism to implement
secure and anonymous routing protocols.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we observe that existing anonymous communication protocols
designed for ad hoc networks have not been able to accommodate accountability,
they are seriously vulnerable to other forms of threats, such as the Denial-of-Service
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attack. Based on this observation, we presented an anonymous authentication ar-
chitecture with distributed anonymity revocation. While it is impossible to pro-
vide perfect anonymity and accountability at the same time, our scheme provides
a framework that allows flexible trade-off between these two security requirements.
Anonymity is provided, and can be revoked, through using pseudonyms, which are
specially constructed according to the threshold secret sharing schemes. Based on
the secret handshake approach, our authentication protocol ensures anonymity of
benign users against eavesdroppers. A special property of our scheme is that trans-
actions between benign users are strongly protected in terms of anonymity, even if
both users’ identities are already recovered by adversaries.
Future work includes designing and implementing communication protocols
under the same framework. In particular, we plan to investigate how anonymous and
yet secure routing protocols can be implemented through this approach. Another
closely related topic is intrusion detection, especially distributed intrusion detection.
As accountability is provided, more efforts are needed to adapt current (or design




It has been clearly demonstrated that covert communication can occur via
controlling ad-hoc network protocols. Performance of the covert channels depends
on various network parameters. In case of the covert channel based on AODV, net-
work mobility turns out to be beneficial to the covert channel performance. Larger
network population allows more information conveyed in each covert transmission,
but it also increases the probability of loss. Very high and very low maximum trans-
mission powers both suppress the covert transmission. Data traffic generates the
need for routes, thus high traffic rate helps the covert communication. For the covert
channel based on the splitting tree algorithm, the covert transmission is error free.
Better throughput is obtained under smaller network size and higher traffic rate. At
low traffic rate, the covert transmitter can improve the throughput by aggressively
transmits dummy packets, at the cost of being more easily detectably. The cover
transmitter can also make strategic moves according to its own eagerness to trans-
mit and willingness of being exposed. Various improvements to the basic splitting
algorithms do not eliminate the covert channel, although they have different affects
on it.
To support anonymous communication in wireless ad hoc networks, a novel
construction of anonymous trapdoor has been presented. The new trapdoor con-
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struction scheme requires simple key management, provides strong anonymity, sup-
ports anonymous authentication and key establishment, and thus is most compatible
with other secure routing schemes.
Finally, it is observed that existing anonymous communication protocols de-
signed for ad hoc networks have not been able to accommodate accountability.
Based on this observation, an anonymous authentication architecture with dis-
tributed anonymity revocation is proposed. While it is impossible to provide perfect
anonymity and accountability at the same time, our scheme provides a framework
that allows flexible trade-off between these two security requirements. Anonymity
is provided, and can be revoked, through using pseudonyms, which are specially
constructed according to the threshold secret sharing schemes. Based on the se-
cret handshake approach, our authentication protocol ensures anonymity of benign
users against eavesdroppers. A special property of our scheme is that transactions
between benign users are strongly protected in terms of anonymity, even if both
users’ identities are already recovered by adversaries.
Future work includes incorporating the new trapdoor into a complete anony-
mous routing protocol, and evaluating the routing performance. Given the proposed
distributed anonymity revocation architecture, current intrusion detection schemes
can be adapted (or new schemes are to be designed) to work under the same frame-
work. A joint investigation is needed that incorporates all different secure properties
using various secure mechanisms across multiple protocol layers of the network.
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